Defamation and the First Amendment: The End of the Affair by LeBel, Paul A.
William & Mary Law Review
Volume 25 | Issue 5 Article 4
Defamation and the First Amendment: The End of
the Affair
Paul A. LeBel
Copyright c 1984 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr
Repository Citation
Paul A. LeBel, Defamation and the First Amendment: The End of the Affair, 25 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 779
(1984), http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol25/iss5/4




A moment's reflection on the title of this Sympo-
sium-"Defamation and the First Amendment"--will help put
into perspective the analysis and proposals of the three principal
speakers. Until the decision in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan"
twenty years ago, a symposium on defamation and the first amend-
ment would have made about as much sense as a symposium on
psoriasis and the first amendment: each of the terms refers to a
matter of some independent interest, but the link between the two
would not have been intuitively apparent. Had this Symposium
been held ten years ago, we would have focused our attention on
the extent to which Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.2 indicated that
first amendment considerations dominated ground previously oc-
cupied by the tort law of defamation. While some of the sympo-
sium's participants would undoubtedly have been alarmed by the
Supreme Court's rejection of the Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.3
"matters of public or general concern" trigger4 for application of
the New York Times actual malice rule,' the more significant com-
ments about Gertz would have addressed the Court's extension of
first amendment restrictions into additional aspects of the law of
defamation. In light of that extension, the title of this Symposium,
had it been held in 1974, might well have been "Defamation or the
First Amendment."
* Associate Professor of Law, College of William and Mary. A.B. 1971, George Washing-
ton University; J.D. 1977, University of Florida. These remarks were delivered in a slightly
different form as commentary following David Anderson's address on "Reputation, Com-
pensation, and Proof," April 6, 1984.
1. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
2. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
3. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
4. Id. at 44.
5. See 376 U.S. at 279-80.
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If this Symposium were to be held ten years from today, the link
between the first amendment and the law of defamation probably
would be substantially weaker than predicted in the first great
rush of cases following New York Times.6 At the very least, the
expansion of first amendment protection of defamatory speech,
and the intrusion of the first amendment into other tort actions,7
will have slowed in the next decade.
The year 1984 may turn out to be as significant for defamation
and the first amendment as 1964, the year of New York Times,
and 1974, when Gertz was decided. If the recent defamation juris-
dictional decisions 8 are any indication, I do not expect the Su-
preme Court to use the opportunity presented by the granting of
certiorari in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders9 to ex-
tend the scope of first amendment protection. 10 Indeed, it is not at
6. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia,
Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971); Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265 (1971); St. Amant v.
Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); Associ-
ated Press v. Walker, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966).
7. See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
8. Calder v. Jones, 104 S. Ct. 1483 (1984); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, 104 S. Ct. 1473
(1984).
9. 104 S. CL 389 (1983).
10. During the presentation of these remarks in April, I speculated that the Court also
might limit the scope of protection by deciding in Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United
States, 104 S. Ct. 1949 (1984), that the qualified constitutional privilege of New York Times
does not apply to product disparagement cases. In Bose, both the United States District
Court for the District of Massachusetts and the United States Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit held that the plaintiff was required to show actual malice in order to establish the
defendant's liability in a product disparagement case. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union
of United States, 692 F.2d 189 (1st Cir. 1982), af'd, 104 S. Ct. 1949 (1984). The district
court found actual malice, and entered a judgment for the plaintiff. Bose Corp. v. Consum-
ers Union of United States, 529 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1981), rev'd, 692 F.2d 189 (1st Cir.
1982), aff'd, 104 S. Ct. 1949 (1984). The First Circuit reversed on the issue of liability, how-
ever, concluding that the trial judge had inferred actual malice too readily from the proof of
falsity. 692 F.2d at 197.
The Supreme Court could have used Bose to limit the application of the constitutional
protection recognized in New York Times to defamation actions, thereby indicating that the
expansion of that protection into other speech or press related tort actions is not constitu-
tionally required. Instead, the Court limited its inquiry to whether the First Circuit should
have engaged in "a de novo review, independently examining the record to ensure that the
district court has applied properly the governing constitutional law and that the plaintiff
has indeed satisfied its burden of proof." Id. at 195. Having reached the issue of the appro-
priate appellate standard of review, the Court could have restricted its opinion to a fairly
narrow interpretation of rule 52 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See 104 S. Ct. at
1952-53. Given the wide discrepancy between judge and jury conclusions on the constitu-
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all unlikely that the Court will decide during the October 1984
Term11 that the Gertz prohibition of strict liability and its restric-
tions on the recovery of presumed and punitive damages do not
apply to nonmedia defamation defendants.12 Thus, while the rela-
tionship between defamation and the first amendment may never
be-and indeed should not be-totally severed, the "affair" could
well be on the wane.
II. INJURY AND WRONG
If the trend of placing constitutional restrictions on the tort law
of defamation is approaching or has already reached its peak, two
important consequences follow. First, the arena for the resolution
of the conflict between speech and reputational interests shifts
from the United States Supreme Court to the states and, second,
tional issues involved, see LIEEL DEFENSE RESoURcE CENTER, BuLL. No. 7, INDEPENDENT AP-
PELLATE REVIEW IN LIBEL ACTIONS SINCE New York Times v. Sullivan (1983), and the gen-
eral demise of heightened scrutiny for review of "constitutional facts" in such contexts as
Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U.S. 287 (1920), the Court easily could
have decided that a sweeping endorsement of de novo review was inappropriate. The Court
indicated, however, that whether the factfinder was a judge or a jury did not affect the rule
requiring an independent review of the actual malice finding. See 104 S. Ct. at 1959.
Although the Court did not limit the scope of first amendment protection in Bose, the
application of New York Times to product disparagement cases remains unclear. The Court
expressly refused to decide the issue in Bose. See 104 S. Ct. at 1966. Moreover, Justices
Rehnquist and O'Connor suggested that they might not apply New York Times when the
issue is presented. See id. at 1967-68 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("It is ironic ... that a
constitutional principle which originated in New York Times... because of the need to
criticize the conduct of public officials is applied here to a magazine's false statements about
a commercial loudspeaker system."). See also infra note 12.
11. After hearing arguments in Dun & Bradstreet, the Court scheduled the case for rear-
gument in the October 1984 Term. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, 52
U.S.L.W. 3937 (U.S. June 26, 1984).
12. In Dun & Bradstreet, the Supreme Court of Vermont held that the Gertz standards
of liability and damages did not apply to actions between private plaintiffs and nonmedia
defendants. Greenmoss Builders, Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 143 Vt. 66, 461 A.2d 414
(1983), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 389 (1983). The court held that the federal Constitution did
not require such an extension of Gertz, and declined to adopt the Gertz rules as a matter of
state law. 143 Vt. at 75-76, 461 A.2d at 418-19. But cf. Jacron Sales Co. v. Sindorf, 276 Md.
580, 592, 350 A.2d 688, 695 (1976) (adopting the Gertz rules as a matter of state law). In
scheduling Dun & Bradstreet for reargument, see supra note 11, the United States Supreme
Court directed the parties to address whether the restrictions on presumed and punitive
damages should apply to defamation actions involving nonmedia defendants or commercial
or economic speech. See 52 U.S.L.W. at 3937.
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the terms of the debate are altered to a significant degree.13 Rather
than focusing on the federal constitutional limitations on a state's
tort law, the next rounds of the defamation debate are likely to
resemble the controversy in some other branches of tort law. 4 In
these next rounds, the reconciliation of competing interests is go-
ing to be made within the constraints of the political process.
Rather than subjecting reputational interests to a first amendment
trump, the participants in this debate ought to be increasingly re-
sponsive to more popular notions of the fair treatment of individu-
als and the control of largely unchecked institutions capable of in-
flicting serious harm.
David Anderson's views on proof of injury to reputation 5 should
be judged as a contribution to that debate,' 6 and his conclusion
should be rejected. Anderson urges the elimination of presumed
harm to reputation from the law of defamation, and insists on
proof of actual harm to reputation as a prerequisite to any defama-
tion recovery.' 7 Comparing the tort of defamation to the general
trends in tort law, Anderson describes the focus of tort law as hav-
ing shifted from wrong to injury, and notes that this shift has not
occurred in the law of defamation, leaving defamation as "the only
13. This latter point is true only insofar as state courts do not feel compelled by state
constitutional provisions to expand the protection afforded by the federal Constitution. At
some point in a continued expansion of state constitutional free speech and free press guar-
antees, the states should begin to run into side constraints in the form of constitutional
provisions for equal protection, due process, and access to courts or remedies for wrongs.
14. The current effort to reform products liability law through federal legislation provides
an example. See Hearings on S. 44 Before the Subcomm. on the Consumer of the Senate
Comm. on Commerce, Science and Transp., 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). S. 44 was revised
in the Staff Working Draft of October 19, 1983, approved by the Senate Commerce Commit-
tee on March 27, 1984, and reported to the Senate on May 23, 1984. See 130 CONG. REc.
S6360 (May 23, 1984); 12 PROD. SAFETY & LIAB. REP. (BNA) 261-70 (Mar. 30, 1984). State
statutory reforms before the shift to federal legislative efforts are collected in Birnbaum,
Legislative Reform or Retreat? A Response to the Product Liability Crisis, 14 FORUM 251,
269-85 (1978).
15. Anderson, Reputation, Compensation, and Proof, 25 WM. & MARY L. REv. 747 (1984).
16. I do not understand Anderson to be basing his proposed reform of defamation law on
constitutional grounds. As such, his analysis provides a welcome relief from the typical ef-
forts to turn all defamation issues into matters of constitutional import. See, e.g., Van Al-
styne, First Amendment Limitations on Recovery from the Press-An Extended Comment
on "The Anderson Solution," 25 WM. & MARY L. REv. 793 (1984).
17. Anderson, supra note 15, at 758.
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tort that allows substantial recovery without proof of injury." 8
Even if that depiction of tort law trends is accurate, 9 Anderson
attaches too little importance to the most significant lesson to be
drawn from his summary: at the core of every successful 0 defama-
tion case, there is going to be a wrong. The major significance of
New York Times and Gertz is that defamation is the first tort in
which, as a federal constitutional matter, wrongful conduct by the
defendant has been made an essential element of the plaintiff's
prima facie case.21
The nature of the wrongful conduct in current defamation law is
firmly grounded in the reputational interest of'the victim. The
wrong consists of publishing false statements of fact that have the
demonstrated capacity 2 to injure the reputation of the victim,
18. Id. at 748.
19. A respectable body of scholarly and judicial opinion indicates that even strict prod-
ucts liability cases have not abandoned the underlying concept of the defendant's wrongful
conduct. See, e.g., Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 363 A.2d 955 (1976); Wade,
A Conspectus of Manufacturers' Liability for Products, 10 IND. L. Rav. 755 (1977).
20. A successful outcome in a defamation case is, of course, a matter of perspective. I am
using the term to indicate a plaintiff's success in establishing each of the elements of the
prima facie constitutional and state tort law case. At the Practicing Law Institute (PLI)
symposium, New York Times v. Sullivan: The Next Twenty Years (Mar. 8-9, 1984), chaired
by Richard N. Winfield, "success" in a defamation action meant almost exclusively judg-
ments for media defendants, with a more modest degree of success consisting of plaiptiffs'
judgments being set aside by appellate courts. The more extreme ideas of success seem to
consist of media defendants securing judgments on the pleadings well before any plaintiff
with the gall to threaten the underpinnings of constitutional government by filing a defama-
tion action ever has an opportunity to subject the media defendant to the indignity of a
discovery process capable of producing evidence of the defendant's fault! This attitude
would explain the critical reaction to Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979), displayed at
the PLI Symposium.
21. This statement needs to be qualified, of course, to whatever extent the Gertz prohibi-
tion of strict liability is inapplicable to cases involving private plaintiffs and nonmedia de-
fendants. I detect in the scholarly literature represented by Professor Anderson's paper lit-
tle concern for nonmedia interests, and will assume for the rest of this Commentary that the
prototypical defamation action contemplates a media defendant.
22. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). The holding that states can
define the fault standard in private plaintiff cases, as
"long as they do not impose liability without fault,. . . obtains where, as here,
the substance of the defamatory statement 'makes substantial danger to repu-
tation apparent.'. . . Our inquiry would involve considerations somewhat dif-
ferent... if a State purported to condition civil liability on a factual misstate-
ment whose content did not warn a reasonably prudent editor or broadcaster
of its defamatory potential."
Id. at 347-48 (footnote omitted).
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with at least some degree of fault in not keeping those false state-
ments of fact out of public circulation. When a plaintiff can prove
that the defendant acted in that wrongful manner, no compelling
reason exists to let the defendant escape legal responsibility for its
conduct simply because the manner in which the defendant's
wrong harmed the plaintiff happened to be something other than
provable injury to reputation. Limiting defamation in the way An-
derson proposes involves an excessively rigid conceptualization of
this tort action that is present nowhere else in tort law. In the
traditional intentional tort actions, for example, intent to commit
one category of harm can satisfy the intent element when the
plaintiff actually suffers a different category of harm.23 Under the
standard American approach to proximate cause in negligence ac-
tions, the unforeseeability of the precise manner in which a fore-
seeable victim suffers a foreseeable type of harm will not preclude
the defendant's liability, and the classification of the type of harm
that is foreseeable is subject to broad interpretation.24
III. THE PRESUMPTION OF HARM
Any analysis of the effects of presuming harm to reputation
must proceed from two premises that Professor Anderson's paper
recognizes only sporadically, if at all. The first premise is that the
existing parameters of constitutional protection of speech and the
press in defamation cases are, and should remain, well entrenched.
Public officials and public figures must establish New York Times
25actual malice in order to recover, private individuals must show
at least negligence to recover from media defendants,26 and pre-
sumed and punitive damages are unavailable absent a showing of
actual malice. That level of constitutional protection faces no
credible threat of contraction. Accordingly, the analysis of the ef-
fects of presumed harm to reputation must distinguish between
cases in which the plaintiff can prove actual malice and those in
23. See Prosser, Transferred Intent, 45 TEx. L. REv. 650 (1967).
24. See, e.g., Petition of Kinsman Transit Co., 338 F.2d 708 (2d Cir. 1964).
25. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); Associated Press v. Walker, 388
U.S. 130 (1967); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S 254 (1964).
26. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974).
27. Id. at 349-50.
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which the plaintiff can establish only a lesser measure of fault.
The second premise that Anderson seems to ignore is that a dis-
tinction should be drawn between presumed harm to reputation
and presumed damages. A presumption of harm to reputation sup-
plies the injury element of the tort action of defamation, and
brings defamation into the tort mainstream that Anderson de-
scribes.28 A presumption of damages, on the other hand, entities
the tort plaintiff to compensation even in the absence of any proof
of actual loss. Although presumed damages permit a factfinder to
make an award of damages with no proven factual basis, presumed
harm to reputation does not necessarily have to be translated into
any monetary recovery for the plaintiff. As I understand Ander-
son's arguments, his concern with presumed damages leads him to
an unwarranted attack on the presumption of harm to reputation.
When the two premises are combined, the apparently drastic
consequences of presuming harm to reputation shrink to reasona-
ble proportions. If the plaintiff can prove only that the defendant
was negligent in publishing false statements of fact about the
plaintiff, the amount of the plaintiff's recovery will be limited to
those damages that the plaintiff can prove. Although the actual in-
jury requirement of Gertz29 means that a presumption of harm to
reputation might still play an important role in a case governed by
Gertz, this presumption does not result in a presumption of dam-
ages for the presumed harm. If the plaintiff is unable to prove any
actual harm to reputation, then the plaintiff will recover no dam-
ages for reputational harm.
The presumption of harm to reputation can operate in the plain-
tiff's favor in a case subject to the Gertz rules by permitting the
plaintiff to surmount Anderson's proposed hurdle of proof of in-
jury to reputation and proceed to prove and recover damages for
any actual injury that was inflicted by the defamatory statements.
If the plaintiff can establish to a factfinder's satisfaction that the
defamatory statements caused emotional distress, to take the most
frequently asserted nonreputational harm, a state may allow the
plaintiff to recover damages for that harm. 0 Even in this situation,
28. See supra text accompanying note 18.
29. See 418 U.S. at 349-50.
30. See Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 460-61 (1976).
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however, the plaintiff's recovery will be subject to the usual tort
doctrinal safeguards. For example, the emotional distress must be
a foreseeable consequence of the defendant's wrongful conduct, the
emotional distress must be proximately caused by the defendant's
wrongful conduct, and some rational basis must support the
amount of the award.
In a case in which liability is based only on the defendant's neg-
ligence, a presumption of harm to reputation does not result in the
defendant being liable for anything other than the provable harm
actually suffered by the plaintiff. The problems of quantifying and
defending claims for items of damages such as emotional distress
are matters that the tort bar has had to confront for years. If those
matters are exceptionally terrifying to defamation defendants, the
solution is more appropriately sought in an improved defamation
defense bar31 and an insurance mechanism that accurately reflects
the exposure to liability for such items of damages as emotional
distress.3 2
31. During the presentation of papers and comments on those papers at this Symposium
in April, a number of participants made statements to the effect that "I don't know what
negligence means." I see no reason why an admitted failure to comprehend a liability theory
for which we have approximately a century and a half of accumulated experience should be
considered a persuasive argument for the defamation defense bar. Perhaps paying some
careful attention to the tort milieu in which defamation cases are located, rather than en-
gaging in first amendment posturing, would produce a deeper understanding of the tort
doctrines that apply to defamation.
The choice of counsel for CBS in the Westmoreland suit may illustrate the point I am
making. See Westmoreland v. CBS, Inc., 10 MEDIA L. Rm'. (BNA) 1215 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
Apparently recognizing that the most significant characteristic of Westmoreland's action
was that it was a "big case," similar to an antitrust action, CBS obtained the services of
David Boies, an exceptionally able lawyer who had no previous defamation experience, but
who did have experience with massive antitrust litigation. See generally J. STEwART, Tnx
PARTNERS: INSIDE AMERICA'S MOST POWERFUL LAW FiRMS 62-104 (1983). That experience
seems to be a better rationale for hiring Mr. Boies than his ability to try a case before a
South Carolina jury. But see D. KowET, A MATTER OF HONOR 234-35 (1984). In smaller
cases, defamation defendants might be well served by lawyers who are experienced in jury
trials of tort actions other than defamation, particularly in representing defendants, such as
insurance companies or physicians, who elicit little sympathy from the typical juror.
32. Some of the financial pressure of defamation judgments could be relieved by insuring
against liability. The type of insurance crisis that occurred in medical malpractice, see
Brant, Medical Malpractice Insurance: The Disease and How to Cure It, 6 VAL. U.L. Rv.
152 (1972), and products liability might be avoided if media insurance is underwritten in
such a way that premiums accurately reflect media exposure to liability for such nonreputa-
tional damages as emotional distress.
[Vol. 25:779
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The more problematic situation occurs when a presumption of
harm to reputation enables the plaintiff to recover damages for
harm that the plaintiff did not prove he actually suffered. The ma-
jor safeguard for defamation defendants in this situation, of
course, is the constitutional requirement that, to recover presumed
damages, the plaintiff must make the threshold showing of New
York Times actual malice. When the plaintiff is able to establish
that the defendant knew that the statements it published about
the plaintiff were false, "that the defendant in fact entertained se-
rious doubts as to the truth" of the statements, 3 or that the de-
fendant published the statements despite a "high degree of aware-
ness of . . probable falsity,""4 arguments about the adverse
consequences of imposing liability on the defendant leave me un-
moved. We cannot realistically expect a defendant whose conduct
has been proven to constitute fault of the magnitude of New York
Times actual malice to escape liability solely because the plaintiff
has been unable to establish any actual harm to reputation. Re-
quiring proof of actual harm to reputation in such cases is an idea
that deserves little support in the tort law forum in which the non-
constitutional aspects of a modern law of defamation are going to
be defined.
The real concern with presumed damages seems to be not so
much that the defendant is liable, but rather the amount of the
defendant's liability.3 5 In addressing that concern, Professor An-
derson's proposed abolition of the presumption of harm to reputa-
tion is insufficiently responsive both to the level of the defendant's
fault and to the plaintiff's interest in being protected from the
harmful effects of that wrongful conduct. Anderson's approach is
apt to lead to the kind of trap that is illustrated in Keeton v. Hus-
tler Magazine,6 in which the Supreme Court upheld New Hamp-
33. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968).
34. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964).
35. For this reason, punitive damages seem to pose more of a problem for media defen-
dants than either presumed harm to reputation or presumed damages. The most critically
needed reform of defamation law concerns punitive damages, and should proceed along two
tracks: first, punitive damages should be limited to cases in which the defendant knew the
defamatory statements were false; and second, insurance coverage for punitive damages
should be permitted in defamation cases.
36. 104 S. Ct. 1473 (1984).
1984]
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shire's jurisdiction over Hustler magazine. The Court acknowl-
edged New Hampshire's interest in providing a forum for libel
actions, but described that interest in terms that introduce a pur-
pose for defamation law that previously had not been embraced as
explicitly by the Court. From the premise that "[flalse statements
of fact harm both the subject of the falsehood and the readers of
the statement,"37 the Court concluded that the state "may rightly
employ its libel laws to discourage the deception of its citizens."38
Anderson's thesis that "compensating individuals for actual harm
to reputation is the only legitimate purpose of defamation law to-
day"3 9 appears less tenable when the Supreme Court appears to be
actively engaged in an expansion of the recognized purposes of def-
amation actions. I would prefer to see the debate on defamation
focus on the individual interest in reputation, rather than a state's
interest in protecting its citizens from false statements, but my
concern is that reshaping defamation law in the way that Anderson
proposes would make defamation law increasingly less able to pro-
vide adequate protection for the reputational interest, and would
thus foster a search for alternative or supplemental interests for
defamation law to serve.
IV. THE REMEDY OF REPAIR
If the Gertz rule permitting presumed damages upon proof of
New York Times actual malice remains in effect, I would offer the
defamation defendant the opportunity to take advantage of a
counterpresumption. The presumption of damages, even as it is
currently limited by Gertz, is justified only by a reasonable confi-
dence that statements with the capacity to injure a person's repu-
tation actually produce that injury, even if not in a readily identifi-
able way. If this unidentifable harm can be made the subject of a
presumption that it exists, I propose a corollary presumption that
the unidentifiable harm can be alleviated. Accordingly, if the de-
fendant would take an amount of resources equivalent to those
used to defame the plaintiff4" and devote those resources to coun-
37. Id. at 1479.
38. Id.
39. Anderson, supra note 15, at 749.
40. These resources include the cost of reportorial and editorial functions, publicity, dis-
[Vol. 25:779
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tering the false statements of fact, I would presume that any un-
identified injury to reputation had been remedied. This presumed
remedy thus eliminates the ability of the defamed individual to
obtain monetary compensation for unproven harm to reputation,
even after a showing of actual malice.
My proposal is not a retraction proposal,41 nor is it merely a de-
claratory judgment of falsity.42 Most significantly, it does not re-
quire the major modifications of defamation law called for in An-
derson's proposed abolition of the presumption of harm to
reputation43 or in Marc Franklin's proposed action for restora-
tribution, and any other efforts that go into publicizing the defamatory statements about
the plaintiff.
41. A retraction could merely withdraw what had been published about the plaintiff. My
proposed remedy of repair would require the defamation defendant to explain the defama-
tory statement, and the circumstances that caused the defendant to publish it. Unlike a
retraction, which may not be as prominently displayed or located in a position comparable
to the original defamation, the repair would occupy as much space or time as the defama-
tory communication. Supervision of the repair would involve a minimal effort by the trial
judge or a master appointed for the purpose.
An effective repair need not disadvantage the defamation defendant. A detailed explana-
tion of the circumstances under which the defamatory statement was published may provide
the public with a better sense of the pressures surrounding the publication or broadcast, as
well as the standards that were used to ensure accuracy. If the defendant has adopted more
safeguards since the defamation was originally communicated, describing the improvements
should have a favorable impact on the image of the defendant.
42. See Schaefer, Defamation and the Mrst Amendment, 52 U. COLo. L. REV. 1, 17-18
(1980). My remedy of repair would not replace an award of damages for any actual injury
the plaintiff has suffered. If a monetary award is needed to attract adequate counsel and to
encourage plaintiffs to risk litigation, the remedy of repair would not eliminate the potential
for such monetary relief.
43. Anderson is too modest in his description of his proposal that defamation be modified
so that proof of actual harm to reputation is required in every case. My proposal does not
require any change in the nature of defamation. Anderson's proposal shifts the focus from
the wrong-publication of a communication that tends to injure reputation-to the injury
caused by the wrong. My proposal promises to reduce the amount of liability in those cases
in which Gertz permits a presumption of damages, but continues to allow victims of defa-
mation to recover for actual harm in cases where the Constitution forbids presumed dam-
ages. Anderson's proposal carries no guarantee of reduced liability when actual harm to rep-
utation can be established-in fact, he sketches a number of interesting new avenues to
pursue in "proving harm"-but his proposal does serve to bar recovery for actual
nonreputational harm, such as mental distress, when a defamation victim cannot also prove
harm to reputation.
I must confess to a certain feeling of chagrin at espousing what is essentially the proposi-
tion, "If it ain't broke, don't fix it." Nevertheless, the presumption of harm to reputation
that Anderson attacks carries with it no more than liability for actual harm, except in those
cases in which the plaintiff establishes actual malice. In those latter cases, my proposal ef-
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tion.44 My presumption of repair would be available to a defendant
after litigation under the existing constitutional and state tort law
rules governing defamation resulted in a finding that the defen-
dant was liable. Furthermore, the presumption would be available
as a substitute for an award of damages only for the unproven
reputational injury element of the tort. To avoid any Miami Her-
ald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo45 problems with state compulsion of
the media, the defendant would have the option of selecting the
remedy of repair as an alternative to the award of reputational in-
jury damages.46
V. CONCLUSION
A remedy of repair is a promising proposal with which to enter
the arena for determining the nonconstitutional elements of a
modern defamation law. Anderson's proposal, in contrast, would
allow too many defamation defendants to escape liability for their
wrongful conduct, and would prevent too many injured parties
from receiving compensation for actual harm simply because of an
inability to prove actual harm to reputation. Although not going so
far as to suggest that the media should be prepared to "minimize
[their] losses,"4 7 I believe that the media would not be well-advised
to insist on proposals that are as unaccommodating to defamation
victims as Anderson's elimination of a presumption of harm to rep-
utation. If defamation law, with its constitutional restraints, is not
permitted to protect the interests of defamation victims ade-
quately, courts may respond by acknowledging the efforts of crea-
tive lawyers to find new methods of protecting those inter-
fectively and efficiently removes the ability of the plaintiff to translate the constitutionally
permissible presumed damages into an award of monetary damages.
44. See Franklin, Good Names and Bad Law: A Critique of Libel Law and a Proposal, 18
U.S.F.L. REv. 1, 29-49 (1983). My proposal would not require the plaintiff to make an elec-
tion between a damages remedy and the remedy of repair. Cf. id. at 43 (requiring the plain-
tiff "to make an irrevocable election between the damage route and the restoration action").
Because the remedy of repair would not be a substitute for all monetary relief, but only for
unproven reputational damages, the proposal does not require any modification of the ex-
isting rule that each party bears its own attorney's fees. Cf. id. at 36.
45. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
46. I would extend this option so that it also covers any award of damages contemplating
future harm to reputation. See Anderson, supra note 15, at 769-70.
47. Schauer, Public Figures, 25 WM. & MARY L. REv. 905, 935 (1984).
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ests-methods that may not carry with them the existing
constitutional safeguards of speech and the press.
